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THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES*
NATHANIEL T.

GUERNSEYt

THE FIRST THING IS TO DEFINE CLEARLY WHAT VE ARE TALKING

ABOUT

(a) What is a public utility?
J OR our purposes, it is a person or corporation engaged in rendering a public service which it is bound to render at reasonable rates,
without discrimination, to any member of the public demanding it in
the locality served.
A state cannot, by a statute declaring a business to be affected by
a public interest, make it a public service if it is not one in fact.
The determining factor is the character of the business itself.,
A franchise authorizing a special use of the streets is not an essential
characteristic of a public utility. Note as utilities without such franchises express companies and radio telegraph companies.
Nor is the right of eminent domain. Telephone and telegraph
companies, both clearly public utilities, have this right in some states
and in others are without it.
The fact that public utilities are subject to regulation, and that
they serve the public, is not infrequently taken as distinguishing them
from other businesses. This is a mistake. It is to be doubted whether
there is any business or any vocation which is not subject to regulation. Pure food laws, those relating to narcotics, those relating to
the hours of labor and to the employment of women and children,
those relating to mining, those relating to many classes of manufacturing, those related to inn keepers, those relating to automobiles, illustrate
the extent of regulation.
And in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. IOO, Chief Justice Taft said:
"Taxation is regulation, just as prohibition is."
* Outline of addresses at the Marquette University School of Law, October

29 to November 2, 1928.
t Vice-President and General Counsel of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company.
'See Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570; Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522; Frost & Frost

Trucking Co. v. R. R. Coin. of California,271 U.S. 583.
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Public utilities are not unique because they serve the public. They
would be unique if they did not. There is no one else to serve. They
serve the same people who are served by grocers, by druggists, by
automobile manufacturers, by practially every kind of business.
The business of public utilities is like every other business in that
it is governed by the same fundamental economic laws.
The conditions as to steam railroads are such as to make them in
many respects a class by. themselves. In what follows no attempt is
made to deal with the railroad situation. What is said is with reference
to the other utilities. Of course much of it is applicable in principle
to railroads.
(b) What is regulation?
The Century Dictionary defines the word "regulation" as follows:
I. The act of regulating, or the state of being regulated or reduced to order.
2.
A rule or order prescribed by a superior or competent authority as to the actions of those under its control; a governing
direction; precept; law; as police regulations; more specifically, a
rule prescribed by a municipality, corporation, or society for the
conduct of third persons dealing with it, as distinguished from
(a) by-laws, a term which is generally used rather with reference
to the standing rules governing its own internal organization and
the conduct of its officers and members, and (b) ordinance, which
is generally used in the United States for the local legislation of
municipalities.
For our purposes "regulation" may be defined as the establishment
of general rules to govern the operation of public utilities and the
provision of machinery for their enforcement.
What we are talking about, then, is (I) the establishment of general
rules to be observed by public utilities in the transaction of their business and (2) the enforcement of these rules through the operation of
the machinery provided by law for that purpose.
II
THE POWER OF THE STATES TO REGULATE

is

THOROUGHLY

ESTABLISHED

(a) Basis of this power.
This powder is frequently said to be based upon the fact that one who
devotes his property to a public use thereby consents to its supervision
through the exercise of the regulatory power. More or less stress is
also sometimes put upon the fact that most utilities enjoy special rights
called franchises with reference to the use of streets and other public
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places, as well as the fact that in some cases utilities have been granted
the right of eminent domain.
It has been noted that not all utilities have such franchises or have
the right of eminent domain.
These reasons seem to be more or less legal fictions. These services
intimately affect the entire public; and the public has never hesitated
to assert the power to protect its interests wherever it has deemed thiis
necessary. As has been stated, every individual and perhaps every
business is regulated more or less.
(b) Extent of power to regulate.
The extent of the power to regulate varies with the character of. the
business-it is not a matter of legislative discretion solely, but depends
upon the nature of the business and how and to what extent it touches
the public.
In general, the utility "is entitled to the privilege of managing its
business in its own way so long as it does not injuriously affect the
' 2
health, comfort, safety and convenience of the public.
The public power to regulate "and the private right of ownership of
such property coexist and do not the one destroy the other."
(c) Regulation is old, not new.
The Puritans in New England regulated the price of beer and bread.
The Cavaliers of Virginia regulated the price of tobacco. They prescribed rules as to how it should be planted and harvested, and how it
should be prepared for market. Fees of lawyers were regulated.'
III
THE POWER TO REGULATE

is

NOT UNRESTRICTED

This power is a legislative power and is subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon legislative action by the Federal Constitution
and by the constitution of the state in question.
In the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it is provided, among other things: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Most, if not all, of the state constitutions contain like provisions.
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. State of Wiscoin., 238
U.S. 491.
'Atlantic Coast "Line Railroad Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 2o6

U.S.

1, 20.

'See Report of American Bar Association,

19o9, pages 350, 351 and 352.
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Two of the most important limitations upon the power to regulate
grow out of this amendment.
It is the established law of the United States that this amendment prohibits the states from imposing upon public utilities
schedules of rates which will not afford a fair return on the
present fair value of the property used or useful in the rendition of the service for which the rate in question is charged.
5
i. This rule was originally established by a very narrow margin.
6
2. But it is now settled by an overwhelming weight of authority.
3. With proper safeguards for the consumer, the rule may be applied to prevent temporary confiscation while a suit is pending7
4. An injunction may be granted where a rate regulating body having taken jurisdiction, delays action for an unreasonable length of time.,
5. Although its earnings as a whole afford it a fair return, a utility
may still invoke the rule against confiscation when it is sought to compel
it to charge a confiscatory rate for a particular class of traffic, or for
9
a particular branch of service, or in a particular territory.
(a)

" Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Pald Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(March

24, 189o).

'Some of the recent cases are: Otfinger, Attorney General, etc., v. The
Brooklyn Union Gas Company, 272 U.S. 579; Ottinger, Attorney General, etc.,
v. Consolidated Gas Company, 272 U.S. 576; McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis
Water Company, 272 U.S. 400; Bd. of P. U. Cont'rs. v. New York Tel. Co.,
271 U.S. 23; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39;
Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 268 U.S. 413; Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276; Knoxville v.
Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352; Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474; Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585; Des Moines Gas Co. v.
Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153; City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water
Co., 246 U.S. 178; Lincoln Gas, etc., Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256; Vandalia
Railroad Co. v. Schmnll, et al., 255 U.S. 113.
' Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comnmission, 261 U.S. 290; New
York v. New York Tel. Co., 189 N.Y.S. 701, (Aff. 194 N.Y.S. 924, 236 N.Y.
615, 142 N.E. 306); Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Mich. Public Utilities
Continission, 292 Fed. 139. See also: Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262
U.S. 43; United States Abilene & Southern Railway Co., 265 U.S. 274; Banton
v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S. 413; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Spillinan, 6 F. (2d) 663..
Smith, et al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587; City of Wagner v.
South Dakota Light & Power Co., 193 N.W. 129, 46 S.D. 389. See also: The
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196; Home Tel. & Tel. Co. of
Spokane v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 206; Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268
U.S. 413; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Spillinan, 6 F. (2d) 663.
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Commission, 274 U.S. 344;
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39; Vandalia R.
Co. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113; Northern Ill. L. & T. Co. v. Commerce Commission,
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6. Note that this constitutional provision is not a guaranty of any
return. It is not the basis of the right to earn. This right is an.incident of ownership. What the constitution does, and all that it does, is
to limit the power of the states to interfere with this right to earn by
prohibiting them from imposing confiscatory rates.
The state, through the exercise of its regulatory powers, may
not encroach upon the domain of management.
i. 'The property of the utilities is their property and is private
property.O
2. The right to manage this property inheres ig its ownership. To
deprive its owners of this right of management even under the guise
of regulation is a taking of property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
(b)

134 N.E. 142, 302 Ili. ii; State ex rel. Ozark Power & Water Co. v. Public
Service ComNtissiol, 229 S.W. 782; 287 Mo. 522. See also: Mft. Carmel Public
U. & S. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13o N.E. 693, 297 Ill. 303; Banton
v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S. 413.
"Board of Public Utility Commissioners, et al. v. New York Telephone
Co. 271 U.S. 23; Banton v. Belt Line Railway Carp., 268 U.S. 413; Missouri
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 2o9 U.S.
io8; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 595;
Bacon v. Boston and Maine R. R., 76 Ati. 128, 83 Vt. 421; Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Towers, 94 At. 330, 126 Md. 59, affirmed 245 U.S. 6; Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of California, 16o Pac. 828, 173 Cal. 577, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 245 U.S. 638.
v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S. 413; Missouri ex rel. South'Banton
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276;
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel., 238 U.S. 340; Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491; City of Fort Smith v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 294 Fed. 1O2; Aff'd. memo. op., 27o U.S. 627;
Citizens' Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8F. (2d) 632; People ex rel.
v. Stevens, 197 N.Y. I, 90 N.E. 6o; The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. Whitcomb, et al., I2F (2d) 279, affirmed (U.S.S.C. Feb. 20, 1928); Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, lO7 So. 894, 16o La. 1028;
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman, 6F (2d) 663; People ex rel.
v. Stevens, 2o3 N.Y. 7, 96 N.E. 114; West et al. v. Philadelphia, Baltimore &
Washington R. R. Co., 141 AtI. 5o9; Bacon v. Boston and M.R.R., 83 Vermont
421, 76 At. 128; Atlantic, etc. R. R. Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 2o6 U.S. I, 2o; Coplay Cement Mfg. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
114 AtI. 649, 271 Pa. 58; Public Utilities Commission v. Springfield Gas &
Elec. Co., 125 N.E. 891, 291 Il.209, 234; Cintcinnati v. Public Utilities Coln,
148 N.E. 817, 113 Ohio St. 259; Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 245 Pac.
656, 117 Okla. 175; City of Huntington v. Public Service CoM., 133 S.E. 144
(W.Va.) ; Columbus Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 14o N.E.
538 (Ind.); Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 97
So. 226, 21o Ala. 151; Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad
Com'nission, 197 N.W. 359, 183 Wis. 96.
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(c)

What distinction will accurately draw the line between regulation and management?
Regulation has already been defined. Management covers the use
and operation of the property by its owners. In operating the property,
its owners must not disobey the rules which have been established for
its regulation.
To illustrate, the rate of speed of street cars through a city, or the
candlepower of gas furnished to a city, or the quality of the transmission to be furnished by the telephone company, may be prescribed
by general regulations. The means to be adopted and the methods to
be used in carrying 6n the business and meeting these requirements are
matters of management to which the power to regulate does not extend.
In Harvey v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 229 Pac., 428,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the commission could not
interfere with a rule requiring men to wear coats in railway diningrooms, and without deciding whether the commission was given any
jurisdiction over the dining-room company, said:
It must be remembered that, while much power is by law given
to the Corporation Commission in the regulation of public utilities,
yet the utility is not the property of the Commission or the state,
but belongs to the company and its stockholders, and the officers
and directors by them seledted must, under proper regulation, be
permitted to manage the property in such proper way as to earn
and pay, if they lawfully can, just dividends to the stockholders.
Regulation must- not be so far extended as to constitute management or operation.
It was not intended by the writers of our organic law that the
funds of our state, raised by the taxation of our people, should
be expended by the Corporation Commission in the conduct of
extensive and expensive hearings upon just what rules of style
and fashion should be followed by a great public utility. Lawmakers must not completely destroy personal liberty. It would
be unwise to leave matters like this to the discretion of inexperienced public officers, selected by the vote of the people, and whose
policies and rules would likely change at every elction. It is
well, ordinarily at least, that we be slow to abrogate rules in such
regard, made by those whose successful life's experience well
qualify them to formulate such internal policies. The rule is not
unreasonable.
In State Corporation Commission v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 255 Pac. 394 (N. Mex.), the court held improper an order of
the commission which required a railroad company to re-establish a
discontinued agency; the commission saying that the company had
failed to show cause sufficient "to warrant the commission" in closing
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the station. The court remarked that the commission was not "created
to manage railroads," but that its function was to protect the public
against unjust and unreasonable deficiencies in service.
A very recent case involving this question is New England Telephone
and Telegraph Company v. Department of Public Utilities et al., 159
N. E. 743 (Mass.).
The Hotels Statler Company, Incorporated, was erecting a large
building in Boston to be used in part for offices and in part as a hotel.
It entered into negotiations with the telephone company, as a result of
which the hotel company was to install conduits for telephone wires in
the building; these conduits to be the property of the hotel company.
The telephone company was to provide the necessary 'cables, switchboards, wires, etc., and was to string these wires in these conduits;
this telephone property to remain the property of the telephone company and subject to its control. The only payment to be made the
telephone company was the usual service charge for service and installation of the telephones in the building, to be paid by individual
subscribers, of whom the hotel company was one.
When occasion arose for the pulling of wires from the feed cables,
already laid by the telephone company, through conduits to the rooms
where the telephones were to be installed, workmen employed by the
subcontractor for all wiring-other than that to be installed by the telephone company insisted that the pulling of these wires should be done
by union workmen affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.
The employees of the telephone company were not so affiliated.
"Strikes, first of the employees of the wiring sub-contractor and later
of all workmen employed on the building, were inaugurated to compel
compliance with this demand. There was no trade dispute between
the wiring sub-contractor and his workmen, nor between the other
workmen on the building and their several employers, nor between the
telephone company and its employees. There were, however, strikes."
Both the hotel company and the telephone company were 'threatened
with great loss.
"The situation was deliberately brought about by the union men
either to force the employment of union labor affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor by the telephone company, or to compel
it to abandon its policy of having all telephone wiring pulled by its
employees."
Wires were pulled by union employees to room 727, and the hotel
company requested the telephone company to install its service at that
room and, upon the refusal of the telephone company, applied to the
commission to compel service over these wires. The commission
ordered the telephone company to furnish service by connecting with
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these wires that had been pulled to room 727, requiring that the title
to these wires be transferred to the telephone company. The proceeding was to reverse this order. The court held that the order infringed
upon the power to manage and was beyond the commission's power,
saying, among other things:
The telephone company insists that the proper performance of
its function in the transmission of speech requires that it shall
own and control the wires over which the transmission of speech
takes place. See Gardner v. Providence Telephone Co., 23 R.I.
262. The commission confirms this claim by requiring in its orders
that one insisting on service shall convey title to the wires and
surrender control of them to the telephone company. The company
further insists that such proper performance also necessitates that
the wires be pulled or put in place by workmen subject to its
contr61; for only thus can it be assured that they are proper and
properly installed. The commission denies this claim, and by its
order required that, without regard to who has selected the wires
and put them in place, the company shall connect with them if
they are properly installed and suitable for the service applied
for. The commission declares that if experience should demonstrate that the service over the wires to room 727, to which it
orders the telephone company to connect, cannot be given without impairing its general service, it would be justified in discontinuing the service until it could remedy the defect. See Northern
Pacific Railway v. Department of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39, 45.
Thus it requires the telephone company to become owners of
property which later it may be called on to reject because it is
incompatible with performing the service which it undertakes to
give. This is an unreasonable interference with its right of property. The determination whether certain wires are suitable and
are properly installed is a detail of management in the administration of the business of the telephone company. To substitute the
judgment of others for that of the telephone company in that
matter is an interference with the right of management which goes
beyond the reasonable limit of public control. It is similar to the
control attempted to be exercised by the State of Wisconsin in
requiring the upper berths in sleeping cars to be kept closed when
not in use, which was held to be unconstitutional in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491. See
also Southwestern Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,
262 U.S. 276; Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S. 413;
Great Northern Railway v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 340. No general
conditions of public necessity are shown to make the orders appropriate and essential for the adequate and equal performance of
the service for the public. The decision of the department discloses that the action is taken to put an end to a particular instance
of hardship.
The fact that cases may be presented where it will be difficult to
draw the line between regulation and management does not militate
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against the soundness of this proposition, any more than the difficulty
in some cases in distinguishing between negligence and due care militates against the fact that there is a well recognized distinction between
them.
(d)

This discussion does not embrace questions as to the Federal
power to regulate.
IV

THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS AND REGULATORY BODIES

Regulation is the exercise of a legislative function.
The functions of the courts are purely judicial.
All but two of the states, Virginia and Oklahoma, have constitutions which divide the functions of governments into
three classes, legislative, executive and judicial, and prohibit
each class from exercising any of the functions of the others.
It follows, therefore, that except in the two states noted the courts
are without jurisdiction to review the legislative acts of regulatory
bodies acting within their jurisdiction. For a court to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislative body in a legislative matter would
be for the court to exercise legislative functions. Knotts et al. v. Nollen et al., 218 N.W. 563.
A court, finding the. existing rate illegal, will not establish a rate
in lieu of it (Emporia Telephone Company v. Public Utilities Coinnission, 154 Pac. 262).
The courts, however, exercise a very important jurisdiction in determining whether the regulatory body has acted within its jurisdiction
and in setting aside actions which are found to be outside of it.
(a)
(b)
(c)

Illustrations are:
I. Rates which are confiscatory. Here the limit of jurisdiction fixed by the Fourteenth Amendment is exceeded.
2.
Interferences with management, which also are prohibited
by this amendment.
3. Arbitrary orders or actions unsupported by any proof.
These are beyond the power of the commissions and are
1 2

illegal.
2See:

Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. The Department of Public Works of

Washington, 268 U.S. 39; Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities Continission,
267 U.S. 359; Ashland Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, 7F. (2d) 924, 931-933;
Illinois Conn. Corn. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 150 N.E. 678, 320
Ill. 214; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., i5o N.E. 668,
320 Ill. 175; State v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., 209 N.W. 872 (Minn.);Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 245 Pac. 656, 117 Okla. 175; City of
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Under the usual constitutional provisions no appeal to the courts
will lie upon the ground that rates fixed by legislative authority are

excessive.
v

THE GENERAL SCOPE OF THE COMMISSION LAWS

At present forty-seven states have established state boards or commissions exercising regulatory powers over utilities or some classes
of utilities. These are sometimes designated as railroad commissions,
sometimes as public utility commissions, and sometimes by other titles.
In some states, as Iowa and Texas, there are broad regulatory powers
vested in cities.
Commissions were created after the practical obstacles in the way
of regulation by direct legislative enactments had become obvious.
The four things that the public is interested in are: (I) good service,
(2)
reasonable rates, (3) freedom from discrimination, and (4) adequate service; that is, good service at reasonable rates, the service
to be broad enough to provide for the demands of all who desire it
and who are so situated that it is commercially practicable to serve
them.
An examination of these laws discloses that substantially all of their
material provisions may be ascribed to one of these four things.
Generally, their scope covers:
(I)
Rates, with provisions authorizing *the utilities to establish
and change rates, and for an examination into rate schedules by the
commission on its own motion, or upon the complaint of the public
and the establishment of reasonable rates by the commission where,
upon such an examination, the rates in question are shown to be unlawful for some reason.
(2)
Service, with provisions for maintaining proper standards and
adequate facilities.
(3)
Capitalization, which largely goes to the question of rates.
(4) Accounting, which also goes to the question of rates.
(5) Prohibition against discrimination.
The outstanding characteristic of these laws is that they are not
intended to create any new fundamental rights in either the public or
the utility, or to take away from either the public or the utility any substantial pre-existing rights. It has always been the right and duty
of the utility to charge reasonable rates. The public has always been
Erie v. Public Service Commn., 123 At. 471, 278 Pa. 512; Kansas v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 115 Kan. 236, 223 Pac. 771 ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Yakinta Northern Stages, Inc., 238 Pac. 905, 135 Wash. 595; United Fuel
Gas Co. v. P. S. Co-mIissiot, 138 S.E. 388 (W.Va.).
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entitled to them. It has always been the duty of the utility to furnish
good service. The public has always been entitled to such service.
Unjust discrimination on the part of the utility has always been illegal.
There has always been an obligation on the part of the utility to
furnish adequate facilities.
These laws do not create fundamental new rights or take away old
ones; what they do is to provide the machinery for the enforcement of
the old-rights of both the public and the utilities.
vi
THE PRIMARY POWER TO MAKE RATES HAS REMAINED IN THE UTILITY

The popular idea that the commission laws have taken away the
13
power of the utilities to establish rates is a misconception.
Before the commission laws were enacted the utilities had the: right
to establish just and reasonable rates and the law prohibited rates
not just and reasonable. This is the situation under nearly all of
the commission laws.
Generally, under the commission laws, the power of the commissions
to make rates arises only where it appears, after a hearing, that the
14
rates made by the utility itself are for some reason unlawful.
In general, in determining the lawfulness of existing or proposed
rates the commission must confine itself to the experience of the
utility in the matter of revenues and expenses and cannot base its
action on estimates of what they should have been. 5
' Walker Bros. Catering Co. v. Detroit City Gas Co., 203 N.W. 492, 230
Mich. 564; Coplay Cement Mfg. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 114 AtI.
649, 271 Pa. 58; City of Hutchson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 200 Pac.
301, lO9 Kan. 545; Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 136 N.E.
676, 304 Ill. 357; North Hemnpstead v. Public Service Corporation, 132 N.E.
144, 231 N.Y. 447; Public Service Commission v. Pavilion Natural Gas Co.,
133 N.E. 427, 232 N.Y. 146; Gillen v. Public Service Ry. Co., 116 AtI. 621, 97 N.J.
Law 333; Duitz v. Kings County Lighting Co., 188 N.Y.S. 67.
"See the various commission laws, and also: Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
v. Commerce Commission, 136 N.E. 676, 304 Ill. 357; Illinois Bell Telephone
Co. v. Commnerce Commission, 137 N.E. 449, 306 Ill. lo9; City of Edwardsville
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 142 N.E. 197, 310 Ill. 618; Wichita R. R. & Light
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 26o U.S. 48; Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson
et al., as Public Service Commissiont, 293 Fed. 208; Patterson v. Mobile Ga
Co., 271 U.S. 131; Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith, Chairman, etc., 295 Fed.
385; Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 197
N.W. 359, x83 Wis. 96; State ex rel. St. Louis County Gas Co. v. P. S.
Commission, 286 S.W. 84 (Mo.). See: City of Fort Sminth v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 294 Fed. 102, aff'd. memo. op., 27o U.S. 627.
" Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm., 197 N.W. 363,
183 Wis. lO4.
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The question whether this condition precedent to the power of the
commissions to make rates exists, is a judicial question, and its determination is a judicial act. The right of the commision to act,
that is, its jurisdiction in such cases, depends upon the existence of the
fact that the rate in question as fixed by the utility is for some reason
unlawful. Whether the evidence establishes this fact is a judicial
question for the courts.16
State v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., 209 N.W. 872 (S. C. Minn.,
1926), is instructive. In setting aside an order holding that a bus
company operated "between fixed termini" within the meaning of a
statute imposing a duty on companies so operating to secure a certificate of convenience and necessity, the court said:
The statute does make it a question of fact to be determined by
the commission, but the finding is not conclusive. As applied to
this case the fact goes to the jurisdiction of the commission, and
though the statute declared
would be open to judicial review even
7
to the contrary, which it does not.'

"Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Depart. of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Ry. Co.,
167 U.S. 479, 499; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93; Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States,
234 U.S. 167, 185; State Public Utilities Commission v. Toledo, St. Louis &
582; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.
Western R. Co., 122 N.E. 158, i6o; 286 Ill.
v. Corporation Commission, 216 Pac. 917, 90 Okla. 84; City of Erie v. Public
Service Commission, 123 Atl. 471, 278 Pa. 512; Monroe Gaslight & Fuel

Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Coin., 292 Fed. 139. Attention is also called
to the following authorities: American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U.S. 541, 547;
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. United States, 238 U.S. I, 9; Payne v.
Kentucky R. Com., 287 S.W. 56o (Ky.); Denver & S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago,
B. & 0. R .R. Co., 171 Pac. 74, 76, 77; 64 Colo. 229; Ilinois Commerce Comm.
v. Cleveland C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 15o N.E. 678, 320 Ill. 214; Superior
Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., 15o N.E. 668, 320 Ill. 175;
Chicago, M. & St. Paul Railway Co. v. State Public Utilities Conmission, io8
N.E. 729, 732; 268 Ill. 49, affirmed 242 U.S. 333; Lusk v. Atkinson, 186 S.W.
703, 704; 268 Mo. log; Grafton County Electric Light & Power Co. v. State,
93 Atl. 1028, 1033; 77 N.H. 490; Potter v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,

98 Atl. 30, 31; 89 N.J. Law 157; Lina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 12o N.E. 330, 332, 98 Oh. St. iIo; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light
& Traction Co., 173 Pac. 556, 563; 52 Utah 21o; Central Steam Heat & Power
Co. v. R. R. Comission, 213 N.W. 298 (Wis.).
' These cases are readily distinguishable from the following decisions, holding
that where a commission is acting within its jurisdiction a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of a commission, and can only annul an order
of the commission when it violates some rule of law: Interstate Commerce

Commission v. Illinois Central R.

R.

Co.,

215 U.S.

452,

470; People v.

McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 87; 113 N.E. 795, (affirmed 245 U.S. 345); Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Towers, 94 Atl. 330, 336, 126 Md. 59, (affirmed 245 U.S.
6); Mangum Electric Co. v. City of Mangum, I79 Pac. 26, 27; 72 Okla. 66.
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Except where the commission law expressly provides to the contrary,
the burden of proof in a commission proceeding is upon the person
assailing existing rates as unlawful.:'
In the exercise of their rate-making powers the commissions are
not unrestricted. The laws make the regulation that rates shall be
just and reasonable apply to the commissions exactly as it does to
the utilities.
VIi

WHAT IS A JUST AND REASONABLE" RATE?

Since the laws require rates, whether made by the utilities or by
the commissions, to be just and reasonable, and since generally the
jurisdiction of the commissions to establish rates only arises where,
after a hearing, upon notice to the utility, the evidence justifies a finding that the rate proposed or complained of is unjust and unreasonable,
or otherwise unlawful, it is of paramount importance to understand
clearly what a just and reasonable rate is.
There is no synonymity between unjust and unreasonable
rates, and confiscatory rates.
A rate which returns more than enough to escape the charge of con-

(a)

fiscation is not on that account extortionate or unreasonable.

A de-

termination that a rate is not so low as to be confiscatory is not a
determination that it is not so low as to be unreasonable.' 9
"Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. United States, 238 U.S. i, ii; Homestead
Company v. Des Moines Electric Co., 248 Fed. 439, 443; Platt v. Lecocq, I58
Fed. 723, 731; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.,
43 Fed. 37 (affirmed 145 U.S. 263); North Coast Power Co. v. Kuykendall,
201 Pac. 780, 117 Wash. 563; Duquesne Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,

117 Atl. 63, 273 Pa. 287; State ex rel. Case v. Public Service Commission,
249 S.W. 955, 298 Mo. 303; Billings Utility Co. v. Public Service Connnission, 2o3 Pac. 366, 62 Mont. 21; Illinois Con. Com. v. Cleveland, C., C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 15o N.E. 678, 320 Ill. 214; In re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 204
N.W. 873, 164 Minn. 279; State ex rel. City of St. Joseph v. Busby, 274 S.W.
io67, IO71 (Mo.) ; State Corporation Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 255 Pac. 394 (N. Mex.).
"Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U.S. 413; Collingswood Sewerage
Co. v. Borough of Collingswood, io2 Atl. 9Ol, 91 N.J. Law 20, (affirmed
lO5 Atl. 2o9; 92 N.J. Law 5o9); Waukesha Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 194 N.W. 846, 181 Wis. 281; State Public Utilities Commission
v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 125 N.E. 89I, 895, 291 Ill. 209; Union Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comisin.sion, 148 Pac. 667, 673, 95 Kan. 6o4; Railroad Commission v. Houston & Texas Central R. R. Co., 38 S.W. 750, 755,
go Texas 340; City of Portsmouth v. Public Utilities Commission, I4O N.E.
6o4, io8 Oh. St. 272; Kansas v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 223 Pac. 771,
115 Kan. 236. The following additional cases either directly support, or in
their discussion tend to sustain, the proposition that the fact that rates produce
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(b)

The words "just and reasonable" are to be taken in their
established sense at the time the laws in question were enacted.
When in a statute the legislature uses words or phrases which have
acquired a well-understood and defined meaning, the legal presumption is that they are used in this sense in the statute.
The words "just and reasonable" are regarded as practically synony20

mous.

A just and reasonable rate is one which justly and reasonably
divides the spread between the cost of rendering the service,
and the value of the service to the patron.
The basis of all businesses is that, upon the average, sound trades
are beneficial to both parties to them. Where the benefit goes solely
to one party to the transaction, the business cannot continue. Public
utilities are no exception to this rule.
The just and reasonable rate is the rate that justly and reasonably,
that is, that fairly and equitably divides the spread between the cost
of furnishing the service, including the cost of the capital used, and
the value of the service to the patron.
Judge Swayze's definition of a just and reasonable rate is:
(c)

On the one hand a just and reasonable rate can never exceed,
perhaps can rarely equal, the value of the service to the consumer.
On the other hand, it can never be made by compulsion of public
more than a fair return is not in itself sufficient to make them unreasonable:
Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 87 Atl. 651,
655, 84 N.J. Law 463, (affirmed 95 At. 1079, 87 N.J. Law 581); Homestead
Co. v. Des Moines Electric Co., 248 Fed. 439, 443; Southern Pacific Co. v.
Railroad Commissioners, 78 Fed. 236, 257; C., M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 459; O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility Comm issioners, 105 At. 132, 134, 92 N.J. Law 44, (affirmed io6 Atl. 414, 92 N.J.
Law 587); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 95; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 699; Canada Southern R. R. Co.
v. International Bridge Co., L. R. 8. App. Cas. 723; Hooker v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 188 Fed. 242, 253 (Reversed, but not upon this question,
225 U.S. 302) ; Board of R. R. Com'rs. of Iowa v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,
i re Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., 67 I.C.C. 156;
20 I.C.C. 18I;
In re Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 67 I.C.C. 426; Detroit
& Mackinac R. R. Co. v. Michigan R. R. CoM., 203 Fed. 864, 87o, affirmed
235 U.S. 402; Ames v. Union Pasific Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 165; Havre de Grace &
Perryville Bridge Co. v. Towers, 103 At. 319, 132 Md. 16; Union Pac. R. R.
Co. v. Utilities Commission, 148 Pac. 667, 672-3, 95 Kan. 604; Morgan's L. &
T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 53 So. 89o, 9oo-1, 127 La. 636;
Five Per Cent Case, 31 I.C.C. 351, 358.
'Thompson v. Beacon Valley Rubber Co., 16 Atl. 554, 557, 56 Conn. 493;
State v. Churchill, OO Pac. 309, 314, 52 Wash. 210; Houston & Texas Central
R. R. Co. v. Everett, 86 S.W. 17, 18; People v. Rosenberg, 112 N.Y.S. 316, 318.
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authority so low as to amount to confiscation. A just and reasonable rate must certainly fall somewhere between these two extremes, so as to allow both sides to profit by the conduct of the
business and the improvements of methods and increase of efficiency. Justice to the consumer, ordinarily, would require a rate
somewhat less than the full value of the service to him; and justice
to the company would, ordinarily, require a rate above the point
at which it would become confiscatory. To induce the investment
and continuance of-capital there must be some hope of gain commensurate with that realizable in other business; the mere assurance that the investment will not be confiscated would not suffice30a
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company et al., 183 U. S. 79,
95, holds that the states' regulation of charges "is not to be measured
by the aggregate of his profits determined by the volume of business,
but by the question whether any particular charge to an individual
dealing with him is, considering the services rendered, an unreasonable exaction."
(d)

The foregoing assumes the value of the service to be greater
than what it costs to produce it.
That this is true is demonstrated by the fact that people not only
buy but demand these services. The fact that to some individuals
the service would be worth less than its cost does not affect this rule.
They are the persons who do not buy the service. The requirements
of a few do not measure the necessities of the community.21
If a community should become stationary or begin to retrograde, this
would not affect the right of the utility to insist that rates established
22
by public authority should at least non-confiscatory
VIII
THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSIONS IS TO REGUIATE RATES-NOT
EARNINGS

No state commission law attempts to limits the amount which any
utility may earn. What these laws regulate is the rates. They authorize and require just and reasonable rates, and by direct inference
recognize the right of the utilities to earn whatever they can under
such rates. Any other doctrine would fail because it would be directly
opposed to sound economic principles.
"Public

Service Gas Co. v. Board of Utility Commissioners, etc., 87 Ati.
O79.
=Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 396; WisconsinMinnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 197 N.W. 359, 183 Wis.
96; North Hennepin Producers' Association v. C., St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 200
N.W. 8o8, i6o Minn. 5o6.
"Ashland Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, et al., 7 F. (2d) 9;4, 935.

65,; affirmed 95 At.
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There is a radical distinction between the regulation of rates and the
regulation of earnings.

23

Ix

THE VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY

OF

A PUBLIC UTILITY

In proceedings for the regulation of rates, the present fair value
of the property used, or useful, in the rendition of the service is
always material and presents many questions.
(a) What is meant by present fair value?
The world "value" is used in its ordinary sense.

"Value" is de-

fined in the Century Dictionary, as follows:

Worth; the property or properties of a thing in virtue of which
it is useful or estimable, or the degree in which such a character is
possessed; utility; importance; excellence; applied to both persons
and things.
The importance of a commodity measured by the amount of
other commodities (commonly represented by money) for which
it can be exchanged in open market; the ratio in which one thing
exchanges against others; the command which one commodity has
over others in traffic; in a restricted (and the popular) sense, the
amount of money for which a thing can be sold; price.
This is what is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
This is equitable. It is a protection of the actual existing property,
no more, no less.
It is an error to talk about value for rate25 making purposes as if
it were something other than the actual value.
The value of any specific property at any particular time is a
fact. There is but one value.
(b) How is value to be ascertained?
It must be determined by the application of sound judgment to
all of the material facts. (Minnesota Rate Caies, vide 24).
Smyth v. Ames (vide 24), and all of the subsequent cases list as
material factors, capitalization, as evidenced by stocks and bonds
outstanding, revenue, original cost, and cost of reproduction.
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company et al., 183 U.S. 79, 95.
2,McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400; Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466; San Diego, etc. Co. v. Jasper, I89 U.S. 439; Willcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S.

I9; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352;

Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Cominission, 262 U.S. 276; See: Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. Southern Pac. Co. et al.,
268 U.S. 346.
2Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company v. United States, 8 F (2d) 747,
749, 756; Havre de Grace & Perryville Bridge Co. v. Towers, IO3 Atl. 319,
332 Md. 16.
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The value of a utility may not be fixed with complete mathematical
accuracy. But this does not discredit such valuations; this is true as
to the value of everything else, and as to many other matters which
we call facts.
X
CAPITALIZATION

Following the leading case of Smyth v. Ames, (vide 24), practically
all of the authorities recognize this as a factor. They do not attempt
to determine the weight which should be given to it, or in fact to
any factor, in any particular case.
It is desirable to prove capitalization because of this rule laid down
in the authorities. As a matter of fact, this evidence usually has but
very little influence in arriving at value.
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 2i2 U. S. 19, presents an exceptional situation, due to the peculiar circumstances under which the
franchises involved there had been capitalized.
XI
REVENUE

This means future revenue, or potential earning capacity, and not
past revenue.
The cases, including commission cases, which hold that in a rate
proceeding this factor is not to be taken into account are not well
considered. The factors which affect value are not determined by the
action of courts, or by legislative action, but are determined by the
public which deals in the property in question. The ability of a public
utility to earn has always been the most important factor affecting
its value. It actually affects value in every purchase and sale of such
property. If what is to be ascertained is value, it must- therefore
be taken into account.

26

XII

ORIGINAL COST

Evidence showing original cost is always competent. Smyth v. Ames
(vide 24), and the long line of subsequent cases citing it with approval.
All that these cases determine is that evidence upon this question
is material. They do not attempt to determine what weight should
be given to the cost evidence in any particular case.
Ancient costs, where there is doubt as to whether they can be accurately ascertained and where the facts as to the prices of material,
wiges and labor when the costs were incurred were radically different
Southern Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76.
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from like facts at the date of the valuation, have but little weight,
for reasons entirely analogous to those that give little weight to what
a piece of real estate cost fifty years ago in determining its value today.
On the other hand, if the costs are recent and the conditions are the
same as, or approximate the conditions prevailing at the date of the
valuation, cost is a factor entitled to great weight so that the custom
is to take the cost of property actually under construction at the date
of the valuation as the estimated cost of reproducing it.
With us both cost and value are measured in dollars. Obviously,
variations between the value of the dollar at the time the cost was
incurred and at the date of the valuation must be taken into account in
27
arriving at the weight to which cost evidence is entitled.
XIII
COST OF REPRODUCTION

(a)

The estimated cost of reproduction is the estimated cost of
reproducing the property with all its attributes in its condition as it existed at the date of the valuation.
The use of this factor in arriving at value is nothing new. It is
an application of the universal practice of checking the value of something offered for sale by ascertaining what it would cost to obtain it
28
from some other source or in some other way
It is a conservative factor because it is based upon the idea of
competition.
(b)

Every utility located where there is ,a demand for its services,
assuming conditions of normal stability, is worth at least what
it would cost to reproduce it.
This proposition presupposes reasonable skill and economy in the
construction and operation of the utility and that the service furnished
by it is worth to its users more than it costs to produce it, this cost
including a fair return on the value.
The value of the property at any time normally cannot be less than
what it would then cost to reproduce it.
The users must either pay this cost of producing the service or do
without it. If they pay less, the utility will ultimately be bankrupted
and the service will necessarily be discontinued.
They will pay this cost of the service because it is less than the
-" See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. Southern Pacific Co. et al., 268 U.S. 146;
Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. R. R. Commission, zii N.W. 76o (Wis.);
Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208.
' Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., 268 U.S. 146;
Ashland Water Company v. Railroad Commission et al., 7 F (2d) 924, 931.
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value of the service to them; they would lose money if they did not
buy the service.
Therefore, the property always has a potential earning capacity of
at least a fair return on what it would cost to reproduce it, and so
is worth at least this amount.
weight to reproduction
The authorities are giving increasing
29
cost as a factor affecting value.
(d) What should be taken into account in making such an estimate?
So far as possible, each step involved in the reproduction of the
property should be taken into account and its cost estimated, beginning
with the inception of the idea and including every preliminary and incidental expense as well as the expense more directly attributable to
the construction of the physical property. Generally, in the practical
work, these items are divided along broad lines into five classes, namely:
i. Preliminary expenses, including cost of organization, obtaining
franchises, preliminary investigations with reference to the enterprise
and some other general expenses.
2. The direct cost of reproducing the physical property, including
cost of real estate, construction of the buildings and the construction
and installation of the remainder of the plant. There should be included the present value-not the purchase price-of patents owned
by the utility and used in the business.30
(c)

McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis Water Company, 272 U.S. 400; Des Moines
Gas Company v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 168; Lincoln Gas &
Electric Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 268; Denver v. Denver Union Water
Company, 246 U.S. 178; Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commissio, 262 U.S. 276; Bluefield Water Works & Impr. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679; The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. Whitcomb et al., 12 F (2d) 279, affirmed (U.S.S.C. Feb. 2o, 1928);
Citizens Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8 F (2d) 632; Ashland Water
Co. v. Railroad Commission et al., 7 F (2d) 924, 927, 930, 933, 938; The
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. The Denver Tramway Co., 3 F (2d) 285;
The Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 299 Fed.
670; Consolidated Gas Co. of N.Y. v. Prendergastet al., 6 F. (2d) 243, affirmed
272 U.S. 576; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission, of South
Carolina,5 F. (2d) 77, 95; Columlms Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 14o N.E. 538, (Ind.); Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, 22o
Pac. 28, 95 Okla. 213; City of Erie v. Pub. Ser. Cor., 123 AtI. 471, 278 Pa. 512;
Roanoke Waterworks Co. v. Commonwealth, 124 S.E. 652, 140 Va. 144; People

ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,
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N.Y.S.

284, 211 App. Div. 272; Worcester Electric Light Company v. Atwill et al., Statutory Court, U.S. District Court, Mass., August 16, 1927.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 265 U.S.
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3. Undistributed structural costs. These are expenses which cannot
be assigned to any particular item of the plant because they are general
in their character. Therefore, they are generally estimated in percentages. Usually they include interest during construction, taxes
during construction, engineering, and contingencies.
4. Working capital.
5. Going concern value.
xiv
DEPRECIATION OF PLANT

This must be taken into account in order to ascertain the cost of reproduction of the property in its condition at the date of the valuation.
The distinction between depreciation and depreciation
charges.
Depreciation of plant is a lessening in value due to wear and tear,
storms, obsolescence, public requirements and many other factors. It
is a physical fact and must be considered.
The depreciation charge is a charge made to provide for the expense due to the depreciation of the various items of depreciable plant.
This expense must be finally treated as part of the expenses of
operation.
(a)

31
The depreciation fund is the property of the utility.

Adequate

provision of this kind is necessary to keep its investment unimpaired.
The determination of what is a proper charge to operating expenses
on account of depreciation is a matter of management, and if made in
good faith is probably not subject to review by regulatory bodies. Their
function should be to determine whether or not adequate provision
for depreciation is being made, and if it is not being made, to require
that this be done.

2

The best and only accurate method of ascertaining the amount
of depreciation is by inspection."
NOTE: The cost of reproduction, less depreciation, when ascertained,
is not a measure of value. It is a factor of great importance in
(b)

'Board of Public Utility Commissioners et al. v. New York Telephone Coinpany, 271 U.S. 23; Brooklyn Union Gas Company v. Prendergastet al., 7 F. (2d)
628, 655, 673, aff'd. 272 U.S. 579.
City of ForthSmith et al. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 294 Fed. IO2;
affirmed in memorandum opinion 27o U.S. 627; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 148 N.E. 817, 113 Oh. St. 259.

'McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis Water Company, 272 U.S. 4o0; Pacific Gas
and Electric Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403; Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission of South Carolina, 5 F. (2d) 77,
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ascertaining value. Normally, value cannot be less than this amount.
See XIII (b), supra.
(c)

It is error to treat the amount of the depreciation reserve
of the property, and
as the measure of the actual depreciation
34
so to deduct it to determine value.
xv
THE PRACTICAL APPLICATPION OF THE REPRODUCTION THEORY

(a) An inventory of the property is the first step.
(b) The reproduction period.
This must be accurately estimated as a basis for the determination
of: (I) interest during construction, (2) taxes during construction,
(3) unit prices, and (4) going concern value.(c) Unit prices.
I. These should be based upon the prices which it is estimated
will prevail during the reproduction period.
Actual units deduced from the experience of the company in question, the units prevailing at the date of the valuation and the trends of
such units during terms of years, are important factors in properly
fixing unit prices but do not actually fix them.
2. Unit prices usually include all costs of labor and material up
to and including the foreman in charge of the work, including freight
on material, and the expense incident to storing it and delivering it
upon the work.
Unit prices and the undistributed structural cost item of contin95; The Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. The Denver Tramway Co., 3 F.
(2d) 285; The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Whitcomb et al., 12 F.
(2d) 279, affirmed (U.S.S.C. Feb. 20, 1928); Winona v. Wisconsin-Minnesota
Light & Power Co., 276 Fed. 996, OO4.
" McCardle et" al. v. Indianapolis Water Company, 272 U.S. 4oo; Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission. of South Carolina, 5 F. (2d) 77;
New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis.sion, 3oo Fed. 822; The
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Walter B. Whitcomnb et al., and
The Home Telephone & Telegraph Company v. John C. Denny et al., 12 F. (2d)
279, affirmed (U.S.S.C. Feb. 20, 1928); Monroe Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Michigan
Public Utilities Commission, 292 Fed. 139; Kansas v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
223 Pac. 771, 115 Kan. 236; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,
198 N.Y. Sup. 193; Charleston v. Public Service Commission, 120 S.E. 398, 95
W.Va. 91; Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 121 S.E. 716, 95
W.Va. 557; Bonbright v. Geary, 21o Fed. 44, 52; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities
Commission, 148 N.E. 817, 113 Oh. St. 259. See also: Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. City and County of San Francisco,265 U.S. 403; Michigan Public Utilities
Commission v. Michigan.State Telephone Company, 2oo N.W. 749, 228 Mich. 658.
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gencies are somewhat interdependent and as to some items there is
no fixed rule or practice among estimators governing the class to
which they should be assigned.
3. Cutting and replacing paving is in fact a part of the cost of
reproduction, though it has generally been disallowed by the courts
up to this time. It is merely excavation and back-filling.
(d) Undistributed structural cost items.
i. Interest during construction.
Interest upon the money invested in the property prior to the date
when the property is put into service and begins to earn, is an element
of its cost.
This interest should be computed at the rate prevailing for loans
upon good security at the time and place of the reproduction. This
interest rate is not affected by what the fair return rate may be.
Taxes during construction.
The property is subject to taxes during the construction period
and these taxes are an element of its cost.
2.

3. Engineering.
Engineering service is essential to the construction of any utility
property.
It is generally measured by a percentage upon the cost of the
structural property.
4. Contingencies.
It is almost inevitable that in any inventory there will be some
omissions, and it is impossible to anticipate all of the contingencies
which may affect an undertaking usually extending over a period of
several years. It is, therefore, necessary to cover this factor by an
estimate, which is usually shown by a percentage upon the estimated
cost of the structural property.
(e) Working capital.
Every going business, in addition to its physical plant, requires a
certain amount of money to enable it to efficiently and economically
transact its business. This is called its working capital.
The amount of it will vary with the variations in the businesses of
the utilities. It should be ample to enable the utility to make current
payments arising out of operation without borrowing money in anticipation of its receipts and to provide for the stock Qf materials and
supplies which is necessary to meet current operating conditions, with
a reasonable cash balance to cover unexpected expenditures and to
sustain the utility's credit.
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Material and supplies on hand may be carried as a separate item
or taken in as a part of the working capital. Which is the better
practice, in any particular case, will probably depend upon the circumstances of the case.
(f) Going concern value.
This, also called going value, is the element in the value of the
property representing the difference between the value of the mere
physical structure sometimes called the bare bones of the property,
and the value of the property as a going concern with customers attached to it and a developed earning power, and with the trained
organization and the records and routines which are incident to the
efficient transaction of its business.
This is an attribute of the physical property and a factor in its
value. 35
The cost of reproducing this factor may be estimated by the comparative method through a comparison of the net earnings of the hypothetical plant and of the actual plant during the period necessary to
bring the earnings of the hypothetical plant up to the level of those of
the actual plant; the present worth of the difference representing the
estimated cost of reproducing this attribute of the property.
Another method has been to attempt to estimate in detail the expenses that would be incurred in reproducing this element of value,
estimating separately each item such as preparing routines, training
employees, securing customers, etc.36
Where the cost of creating this element of value has been paid
37
out of earnings, this does not justify the disallowance of going value.
XVI
DETERMINING VALUE

The determination of the foregoing factors does not determine value.
Value is deduced by applying to them, and every other material factor,
trained judgment.
'McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400; City of Houston v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des
Moines, 238 U.S. 153; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178; Omaha
v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. i8o. See also: Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 262 U.S. 625.
City of Fort Smith et al. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 294 Fed. 302;
affirmed in memorandum opinion, 27o U.S. 627.
'Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Michigan State Tel. Co., 200 N.W.
749, 228 Mich. 658.
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XVII
NET EARNINGS

Where past operations under existing rates are involved, there is
here relatively little basis for dispute."
39
Federal income taxes are undoubtedly a proper expense item.
Where rates, not yet tried out, are in controversy uncertainties as
to future conditions afford room for debate.
Abnormal expenses, large in amount, may be spread over the period
covered by the results attained through them. Instances of expenses
which may be so amortized are bond discounts, expenses of strikes
and those pertaining to rate regulation.
Charges to provide for depreciation are expense items, and must
be included in the operating expenses.
The present necessary depreciation charges cannot be reduced in
estimating expenses because such charges have been more than ample
in the past.4 0
Some courts are recognizing the propriety of including as an expense item an amount for the amortization of past losses which the
utility may have sustained under inadequate rates imposed upon it by
41
the regulatory body.
While commissions not only may, but should do this, courts cannot
42
allow such an expense item in a confiscation case.
XVIII

A

FAIR IETURN IS, AS THE WORDS INDICATE, A RETURN THAT IS
EQUITABLE

A fair return is a return commensurate with the return upon other
investments, taking into account differences in the risk and other material factors affecting the situation.
The market for money is highly competitive and the return must
' Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 197 N.W.
363, 183 Wis. 104.
'Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 262 U.S. 625.
"Board of Public Utility Commissioners, N.J. v. New York Telephone Company, 271 U.S. 23.
" Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 300 Fed. I9o;
Columbus Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 14o N.E. 538, (Ind.);
Petersburg Gas Co. v. City of Petersburg, io S.E. 533, 132 Va. 82; Streator
Aqueduct Co. v. Smith, Chairman, etc., 295 Fed. 385; Louisiana Water Co. v.
Public Service Commission of Mo., 294 Fed. 594. See: Roanoke Water Works
Co. v. Cononwealth of Virginia, i19 S.E. 268, 137 Va. 348.
'2Board of Public Utility Commissioners, N.J. v. New York Telephone Colnpany, 271

U.S.

23.
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be such as will enable the utilities to secure in this market the new
3
money necessary for their business.1
In City of Elizabeth v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,
(123 AtI. 358) the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals said:
The Policy of the law is and should be to aid utilities to properly
function and to render adequate service to the public by permitting
rates to be charged for the service rendered, which will yield an
adequate return upon the capital invested, maintain the property,
and attract capital. The policy should never be one of destrucstarved utility is in no better position to render
.A
tion.....
proper service than a starved horse or a motor car without fuel.
Every utility in a growing community must, if it is to maintain its
service, constantly make additions to its property and so is constantly
required to obtain new capital.
What is fair return is a question of fact to be determined from the
proof on this question, which will vary with different localities and
different utilities as well as with different conditions at different times
in the same locality.
It is important to realize that neither the regulatory body nor the
utility can control what shall be a fair return. This is determined
by the investor.
XIX

A

SUIT ATTACKING RATES AS CONFISCATORY

(a) The general scope of the allegations in such a suit.
To sustain such an action, the allegations must cover the facts
necessary to establish the ultimate fact that the rates in question
are insufficient to earn a fair return upon the property in question.
Each material fact must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence.
(b)

The material facts are the value of the property, its net
revenue under the rates in question, and what rate of return
is fair.

McCardle et al. v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400; Bliefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commissiob, 262 U.S. 679; Alton
Water Co. v. Illiwis Commerce Commission, 279 Fed. 869; Louisiana Water Co.
v. Public Service Commission of Mo., 204 Fed. 954; India=a Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 3o0 Fed. 19o; Consolidated Gas Co. of New
York v. Prendergast et al., 6 F. (2d) 243, affirmed 272 U.S. 576; Middlesex
Water Co. v. Bd. of P.U. Com'rs., 1o F. (2d) 519; Springfield Gas & Electric
Co. v. Public Service Commission, io F. (2d) 252; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.
Prendergastet al., 7 F. (2d) 628, 654, 672, affirmed 272 U.S. 579.
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(c)

Property not used or useful.

The value of such property cannot be included. The words "used
or useful" and the words "used and useful," frequently found in this
connection, authorize the inclusion of the value of property acquired
in advance of present requirements and reasonably necessary to provide for the near future, where this upon the whole is consistent with
reasonably good management.
xx
A

RATE PROCEEDING BEFORE A REGULATORY BODY

The same factors of value, net revenue and fair return are to be
determined; but they are not the only factors and they are not subject
to the rule that each fact must be shown by clear and satisfactory
evidence.
The first thing which the commission should determine is whether the
rates in question, whether they be existing rates or proposed new
schedules, are lawful. Unless they are unlawful, there is no occasion
or authority for action upon the part of the commission, other than a
formal approval. The fact that rates produce more than a fair return
is not enough to warrant the conclusion that they are unreasonable or
unlawful (See authorities, supra 19). If they are found to be unlawful,
the commission should determine what are reasonable rates. Such rates
are to apply to future operations so that necessarily neither the operating expenses nor the return from the proposed schedule can be
determined with entire accuracy.
In performing its duty, the commission is exercising a legislative
or business, rather than a judicial, function. It should take into account all of the circumstances and should endeavor to establish a
schedule which, in the aggregate, will afford return far enough above
the actual cost of transacting the business to furnish the company a fair
profit, with rates far enough below the value of the service to insure
a profit to its users which will be attractive to them.
As between themselves, rates for different classes of service should
be adjusted, not rigidly with reference to the cost of the respective
services, but with reference to an equitable division in each instance
of the spread between the cost of rendering the service and its value
to its user."
"Cock v. Marshall Gas Co., 226 S.W. 464.
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xxI
OTHER PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE COMMISSIONS

Discrimination.
Service.
Capitalization.
Other matters.
XXII
THE FUNCTION OF THE LAWYER IN

MATTERS OF REGULATION

The fundamental questions which determine the jurisdiction of the
regulatory body and the proper basis for its action upon questions
presented to it, as well as the validity of its action upon any particular
question, are questions of law; so that the general responsibility for the
proceedings should devolve upon the lawyer. The lawyer must, in
a particular case, determine what the material questions are and, as
to the material questions of fact, must determine what evidence is
material to their solution and then must marshal and present it.
He must secure thorough co-operation between himself and the engineers, who will produce most of the testimony as to the cost of
reproduction; and the accountants, who will produce most of the testimony as to revenue and financial matters; and the other witnesses.
Such co-operation cannot be effected unless the lawyer thoroughly
understands the facts covered by the testimony of these witnesses and
they thoroughly understand the theory upon which he is presenting
it. The best results cannot be obtained without this kind of cooperation.
So far as possible, the spirit of controversy should be eliminated from
regulatory proceedings. The common interests of the public and the
utilities should be emphasized. The regulatory body and the utility
should work together to bring about results which are reasonable and
so are just, both to the public and to the utility. Such results are
essential to sound regulation and to efficient and economical service;
they cannot be readily accomplished unless both the regulatory body
and the utilities appreciate this and work in harmonious co-operation.
It goes without saying that all material facts should be presented
to the regulatory body frankly and fully. This is necessary as a
basis for the mutual confidence which is essential to the best results.
It is hardly possible to overestimate the tremendous importance
of this work. The statisticians estimate that between one-seventh and
one-eighth of the wealth of the country is at present invested in its
utilities. This investment is growing daily. In itself; it is of tremendous importance; but it is relatively unimportant as compared with
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the value of these various services to the community. They have become essential parts of the business and social machine. Wise regulation facilitates the economical and efficient operation of the machine;
unwise regulation hinders it, involving enormous losses to the public.
The whole matter is in a formative state. The opportunity of
the lawyer is to do constructive work of highly important character.

